Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (2):294-318 (2020)

Abstract
Composition as Identity claims that a composite object is identical to its parts taken collectively. This is often understood as reducing the identity of composite objects to the identity of their parts. The author argues that Composition as Identity is not such a reduction. His central claim is that an intensional notion of composition, which is sensitive to the arrangement of the composing objects, avoids criticisms based on an extensional understanding of composition. The key is to understand composition as an intensional kind of identity relation, many-one identity. Eventually, the author suggests an arrangement condition for many-one identity that allows him to distinguish between composite objects, even if they have the same parts.
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DOI 10.1163/18756735-000089
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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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