Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pna) (2017)
Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. On this view, what differs in emotional and non-emotional states is the kind of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide non-conscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.
|Keywords||Fear Consciousness Higher-Order theories of consciousness|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1783-1794.
The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 143--170.
Leibniz on Memory and Consciousness.Larry M. Jorgensen - 2011 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (5):887-916.
A Dilemma for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Isabel Gois - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):143-156.
Hop Over FOR, HOT Theory.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
The Higher Order Approach to Consciousness is Defunct.Ned Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):419 - 431.
Higher-Order Thought and Naturalist Accounts of Consciousness.Jurgen Schroder - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):27-46.
Animals, Phenomenal Consciousness, and Higher-Order Theories of Mind.Beth Seacord - 2011 - Philo 14 (2):201-222.
Higher-Order Global States : An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness.Robert Van Gulick - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
Same Old, Same Old: The Same-Order Representational Theory of Consciousness and the Division of Phenomenal Labor.Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):161-181.
Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT Theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.
Prefrontal Lesion Evidence Against Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):721-746.
Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory.Sam Coleman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.
Added to index2017-02-13
Total downloads115 ( #43,220 of 2,177,828 )
Recent downloads (6 months)54 ( #3,716 of 2,177,828 )
How can I increase my downloads?