Abstract

Habermas's discourse ethics is a form of ethical universalism. It holds that ethical norms can be universally valid. On Habermas's view, the universal validity of a norm is established in ethical discourse. Habermas identifies the validity of a moral norm with its universal acceptance in ethical discourse. But I have argued that Habermas has failed to provide enough ground for universal consensus, and so his project of ethical universalism cannot survive. ;To show that universal consensus cannot be achieved in ethical discourse, I have emphasized the context-dependence of ethical discourse. First, I have claimed that there is no universally valid rule of moral argumentation. A moral discourse or argumentation is conducted in terms of the rule of argumentation. But these rules are context-dependent and incommensurable. Habermas thinks that the principle of universalizability is a universally valid rule of moral argumentation. But I have argued that it is far from clear that this principle is universally valid. ;In addition to that, I have argued that moral terms of different cultures or historical periods are different cultures or historical periods are incommensurable. They are incommensurable not in the sense that they are untranslatable, but in the sense that we cannot use the thick moral concepts of other cultures. Thick value concepts of a culture are internally related to their form of life. Unless we share that form of life, we are not in a position to use that concept. Because of this, there cannot be any intercultural moral communication which is free from that kind of distortion. ;As a conclusion, I have argued that every discourse is a local justificatory activity. Only local validity can be established. If we reject Habermas's universalist theory of ethical justification which holds that universal validity of moral norms can be established, then the only alternative we can get is the relativistic theory of ethical justification such as Rawls's method of reflective equlibrium