Ethics 130 (2):211-227 (2020)

Authors
Chad Lee-Stronach
Stanford University
Abstract
Holly Smith (2014) contends that subjective deontological theories – those that hold that our moral duties are sensitive to our beliefs about our situation – cannot correctly determine whether one ought to gather more information before acting. Against this contention, I argue that deontological theories can use a decision-theoretic approach to evaluating the moral importance of information. I then argue that this approach compares favourably with an alternative approach proposed by Philip Swenson (2016).
Keywords Deontology  Decision Theory  Value of Information
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Reprint years 2020
DOI 10.1086/705371
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