Philosophia 38 (3):569-577 (2010)

D. Lewis proposed the reformed conditional analysis of disposition to handle Martin's influential counterexamples to the simple counterfactual analysis. Some philosophers, however, argue that the mere fact that the reformed conditional analysis of disposition can handle Martin's counterexamples should not be regarded as a reason to prefer the reformed conditional analysis to the simple analysis. In this paper, I argue that the reformed version should be preferred not because it can handle Martin's counterexamples but because there are other counterexamples to the simple conditional analysis
Keywords Disposition  Explanation  Simple counterfactual analysis  Reformed counterfactual analysis
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-009-9235-z
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References found in this work BETA

Finkish Dispositions.David K. Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Dispositions and Conditionals.C. B. Martin - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.
Dispositions and Antidotes.Alexander Bird - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):227-234.

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Recent Work on Dispositions.Troy Cross - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):115-124.

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