Experiences and their Parts

In Bennett Hill (ed.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. MIT Press (2014)

Geoffrey Lee
University of California, Berkeley
I give an account of the difference between "Holistic" and "Atomistic" views of conscious experience. On the Holistic view, we enjoy a unified "field" of awareness, whose parts are mere modifications of the whole, and therefore owe their existence to the whole. There is some tendency to saddle those who reject the Holistic field model with a (perhaps) implausible "building block" view. I distinguish a number of different theses about the parts of an experience that are suggested by the "building block" metaphor, but which can be rejected by those who also reject the holistic field view.
Keywords Unity  Consciousness  Part
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027786.003.0013
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Harvard University Press.

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Revelation and Phenomenal Relations.Antonin Broi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):22-42.
The Microstructure of Experience.Andrew Y. Lee - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):286-305.
Selfless Experience.Geoffrey Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):207-243.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
609 ( #7,484 of 2,309,716 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
98 ( #5,759 of 2,309,716 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature