Holes and determinism: Another look

Philosophy of Science 62 (3):425-437 (1995)
Abstract
I argue that Earman and Norton's familiar "hole argument" raises questions as to whether GTR is a deterministic theory only given a certain assumption about determinism: namely, that to ask whether a theory is deterministic is to ask about the physical situations described by the theory. I think this is a mistake: whether a theory is deterministic is a question about what sentences can be proved within the theory. I show what these sentences look like: for interesting theories, a harmless bit of infinitary logic puts in an appearance
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DOI 10.1086/289876
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Regarding the ‘Hole Argument’.James Owen Weatherall - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw012.
Rehabilitating Relationalism.Gordon Belot - 1999 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (1):35 – 52.

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