Holes and determinism: Another look

Philosophy of Science 62 (3):425-437 (1995)
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Abstract

I argue that Earman and Norton's familiar "hole argument" raises questions as to whether GTR is a deterministic theory only given a certain assumption about determinism: namely, that to ask whether a theory is deterministic is to ask about the physical situations described by the theory. I think this is a mistake: whether a theory is deterministic is a question about what sentences can be proved within the theory. I show what these sentences look like: for interesting theories, a harmless bit of infinitary logic puts in an appearance

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Stephen Leeds
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

Citations of this work

Regarding the ‘Hole Argument’.James Owen Weatherall - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):329-350.
Regarding the ‘Hole Argument’.James Owen Weatherall - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw012.
Holes in Spacetime: Some Neglected Essentials.Trevor Teitel - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (7):353-389.

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References found in this work

The hole truth.Jeremy Butterfield - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (1):1-28.
Formal Philosophy. [REVIEW]Richard Montague - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):573-578.

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