Frontiers In 6 (Article 599909):1-13 (2021)

Authors
Jon Leefmann
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Abstract
Although the impact of so-called “sponsorship bias” has been the subject of increased attention in the philosophy of science, what exactly constitutes its epistemic wrongness is still debated. In this paper, I will argue that neither evidential accounts nor social–epistemological accounts can fully account for the epistemic wrongness of sponsorship bias, but there are good reasons to prefer social–epistemological to evidential accounts. I will defend this claim by examining how both accounts deal with a paradigm case from medical epistemology, recently discussed in a paper by Bennett Holman. I will argue that evidential accounts cannot adequately capture cases of sponsorship bias that involve the manufacturing of certainty because of their neutrality with respect to the role of non-epistemic values in scientific practice. If my argument holds, it further highlights the importance of integrating social and ethical concerns into epistemological analysis, especially in applied contexts. One can only properly grasp sponsorship bias as an epistemological problem if one resists the methodological tendency to analyze social, ethical, and epistemological issues in isolation from each other.
Keywords sponsorship bias  manufactured certainty  epistemic wrongness  error  evidence  confirmation
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References found in this work BETA

Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Science, Truth, and Democracy.Philip Kitcher - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Bayes or Bust?John Earman - 1992 - Bradford.

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