Moore’s Paradox And Self-Ascribed Belief
Erkenntnis 55 (3):359-370 (2001)
Abstract
Moore's paradox arises from the logicaloddity of sentences of the form`P and I do not believe that P'or `P and I believe that not-P'. Thiskind of sentence is logically peculiarbecause it is absurd to assert it, although it isnot a logical contradiction. In this paperI offer a new proposal. I argue that Moore's paradox arises because there is a defaultprocedure for evaluating a self-ascribed belief sentence and one is presumptivelyjustified in believing that one believes a sentence when one sincerely assents to it.Reprint years
2004
DOI
10.1023/a:1013382319938
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Citations of this work
Just Another Article on Moore’s Paradox, But We Don’t Believe That.Iskra Fileva & Linda A. W. Brakel - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5153-5167.
Moore's paradox and Evans's principle: A reply to Williams.Hamid Vahid - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):337–341.
Moore's paradox and Evans's principle: a reply to Williams.H. Vahid - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):337-341.
Finkelstein on the difference between conscious and unconscious belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (4):707-716.
References found in this work
Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Studia Logica 16:119-122.
