Erkenntnis 55 (3):359-370 (2001)
| Abstract |
Moore's paradox arises from the logicaloddity of sentences of the form`P and I do not believe that P'or `P and I believe that not-P'. Thiskind of sentence is logically peculiarbecause it is absurd to assert it, although it isnot a logical contradiction. In this paperI offer a new proposal. I argue that Moore's paradox arises because there is a defaultprocedure for evaluating a self-ascribed belief sentence and one is presumptivelyjustified in believing that one believes a sentence when one sincerely assents to it.
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| Keywords | Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Ethics Logic Ontology |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| Reprint years | 2004 |
| DOI | 10.1023/A:1013382319938 |
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
A Reply to My Critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court.
View all 9 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Just Another Article on Moore’s Paradox, but We Don’T Believe That.Iskra Fileva & Linda A. W. Brakel - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5153-5167.
Moore's Paradox and Evans's Principle: A Reply to Williams.Hamid Vahid - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):337–341.
Moore's Paradox and Evans's Principle: A Reply to Williams.H. Vahid - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):337-341.
Finkelstein on the Distinction Between Conscious and Unconscious Belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (4):707-716.
View all 6 citations / Add more citations
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