On Two Recent Arguments against Intellectualism

NCCU Philosophical Journal 43:35-68 (2020)

Authors
Kok Yong Lee
National Chung Cheng University
Abstract
Several authors have recently argued against intellectualism, the view that one’s epistemic position with respect to p depends exclusively on one’s truth-relevant factors with respect to p. In this paper, I first examine two prominent arguments for the anti-intellectualist position and find both of them wanting. More precisely, I argue that these arguments, by themselves, are underdetermined between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. I then manifest the intuitive plausibility of intellectualism by examining the ordinary conversational pattern of challenging a claim.
Keywords intellectualism  epistemic pragmatism  pragmatic encroachment  interest relative invariantism
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