Substantial identity and the right to life: A rejoinder to Dean Stretton

Bioethics 21 (2):93-97 (2007)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT In this article, I reply to criticisms of Dean Stretton of the pro‐life argument from substantial identity. When the criterion for the right to life proposed by most proponents of the pro‐life position is rightly understood – being a person, a distinct substance of a rational nature – this position does not lead to the difficulties Stretton claims it does.

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Patrick Lee
Franciscan University of Steubenville