Dialogue 57 (1):47-66 (2018)

Abstract
In the second Critique, Kant claims that the moral law is given as a fact of reason. In this paper, contra the standard view, I argue that there is a non-dogmatic way of defending this claim. And Kant’s principle of morality is widely taken to be a formal principle. How then can such a formal principle be reconciled with our substantial moral end? In this paper, I also argue that Kant’s principle of morality can be construed as a formal principle in the sense that it provides correctness conditions for moral laws, rather than providing specific moral laws.Dans sa deuxième Critique, Kant affirme que la loi morale se donne comme un fait de raison. Dans cet article, contrairement à la position standard, nous prétendons qu’il existe une autre façon — non dogmatique — de défendre cette affirmation. Par ailleurs, le principe de moralité de Kant est largement considéré comme étant formel. Comment un tel principe formel peut-il être réconcilié avec notre fin morale substantielle? Nous soutenons également que le principe de moralité de Kant peut être interprété comme un principe formel dans le sens où il fournit des conditions d’acceptabilité pour les lois morales, et non des lois morales spécifiques.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s0012217317000622
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,593
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Making It Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory.John Rawls - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (9):515-572.
Kant.Paul Guyer - 2007 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (4):767-767.
The Practice of Moral Judgment.Paul Guyer - 1993 - Ethics 106 (2):404-423.
Objective and Unconditioned Value.Rae Langton - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):157-185.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Do Moral Explanations Matter?Charles Sayward - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:137-142.
Accessing the Moral Law Through Feeling.Owen Ware - 2015 - Kantian Review 20 (2):301-311.
Do Moral Explanations Matter?Charles Sayward - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:137-142.
A Fact, As It Were: Obligation, Indifference, and the Question of Ethics.Bryan Lueck - 2016 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (1):219-234.
Natural Fact, Moral Reason.Dan Passell - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:463-480.
Natural Fact, Moral Reason.Dan Passell - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:463-480.
Against Moral Hedging.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy (3):1-21.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-03-24

Total views
30 ( #369,827 of 2,462,064 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #448,768 of 2,462,064 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes