Authors
Andrew Y. Lee
University of Oslo
Abstract
I argue that experiences can have microphenomenal structures, where the macrophenomenal properties we introspect are realized by non-introspectible microphenomenal properties. After explaining what it means to ascribe a microstructure to experience, I defend the thesis against its principal philosophical challenge, discuss how the thesis interacts with other philosophical issues about experience, and consider our prospects for investigating the microphenomenal realm.
Keywords consciousness  introspection  microphenomenal  microstructure  structure of experience  panpsychism  experience  Russellian monism
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DOI 10.1017/apa.2019.4
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References found in this work BETA

Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.
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Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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