Wittgenstein's Attitude Toward Contradiction

Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo (1992)

Wittgenstein's attitude toward contradiction is not to search out the ultimate criterion of or the significance of contradiction, but to understand how and why each contradiction presents itself. This involves the recognition of the complicated and flexible relationship between what can be said and what cannot be said, since a contradiction borders on nonsense, showing in this way what it is that cannot be said. Contradictions found in philosophical problems are often rooted in the enormously intricate entanglement of the grammar of the surrounding language-game. The characterization of the grammar, and hence the philosophical problems themselves, require a deep concern for these contradictions. Consequently, through contradictions we penetrate into the heart of the philosophical problems
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