A Davidsonian Account of the Practicality of Practical Reasoning

Res Philosophica 99 (1):67-89 (2022)
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Abstract

What makes practical reasoning practical? One answer to this question depends on what counts as an appropriate conclusion of practical reasoning. I defend accounts of practical reasoning that conclude in normative judgment by appeal to Davidsonian judgment-sensitive attitudes. In particular, I defend them against the objection that normative judgments lack a rational connection to action. To be considered practical, judgment accounts, as I call them, need to explain this rational connection. I argue that Davidsonian judgment-sensitive attitudes explain this rational connection by being conceptually related to normative judgments and systemically aiming at getting normative matters right.

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Alexander Leferman
McMaster University

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
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Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.

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