Philosophy and Social Criticism 33 (2):179-201 (2007)

Alexandre Lefebvre
University of Sydney
Kant proposes a unique and necessary presupposition of our faculty of judgment. Empirical nature, together with its diverse laws, must be judged as if it were a coherent unity. In a teleological judgment, we add that nature must be judged as if it were purposively designed for our faculty of judgment. In this article, I argue that Kant's insights on reflective teleological judgment - the least commentedupon element of the Critical philosophy - are adopted by Dworkin towards a philosophy of law and adjudication. I claim Dworkin's concept of ‘integrity’ strictly, but tacitly, partakes of the structure of Kant's teleological judgment in its presumption of systematicity in juridical laws and unity of community which designs and abides its own principles. Throughout, I draw on Gilles Deleuze - a philosopher who complains of being ‘against judgment’ and wishes ‘to have done with judgment’ - to critique both the presuppositions and effects of such teleological judgment and the image of law it proposes. Using Deleuze I hope to characterize and criticize the teleological theory of judgment and also fruitfully engage Deleuze with problems of law scarcely addressed either by himself or by commentary. Key Words: Gilles Deleuze • Ronald Dworkin • integrity • judgment • Immanuel Kant • law • principle • teleology.
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DOI 10.1177/0191453707074138
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Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin (ed.) - 1977 - Duckworth.
Law’s Empire.Ronald Dworkin - 1986 - Harvard University Press.

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