A matter of facts

Abstract
We discuss the justification of Bickle's “ruthless” reductionism. Bickle intends to show that we know enough about neurons to draw conclusions about the “whole” brain and about the mind. However, his reductionism does not take into account the complexity of the nervous system and the fact that new properties emerge at each significant level of integration from the coupled functioning of elementary components. From a methodological point of view, we argue that neuronal and cognitive models have to exert a mutual constraint(MC) on each other. This approach would refuse to award any priority of cognitive approaches over neuroscience, and reciprocally, to refuse any priority of neuroscience over cognitive approaches. MC thus argues against radicalreductionism at the methodological level
Keywords Mind  Neuroscience  Reductionism  Science  Bickle, John
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-005-4072-4
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References found in this work BETA
The Rise of Scientific Philosophy.Hans Reichenbach - 1951 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything About Consciousness?Patricia S. Churchland - 1994 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67 (4):23-40.
Explaining Consciousness: What Would Count?Robert Van Gulick - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.

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Naturalizing the Acting Self: Subjective Vs. Anonymous Agency.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):457 – 478.

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