Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth

Philosophy Compass 9 (3):204-213 (2014)

Abstract

This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or ‘limit’ of inquiry. This account is distinct from – and arguably more objectivist than – views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its ‘internal realism’, not realist enough

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References found in this work

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.Richard Rorty - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Clarendon Press.
Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays 1972-1980.Richard Rorty - 1982 - University of Minnesota Press.

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