Philosophy Compass 9 (3):204-213 (2014)

Authors
Cathy Legg
Deakin University
Abstract
This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or ‘limit’ of inquiry. This account is distinct from – and arguably more objectivist than – views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its ‘internal realism’, not realist enough
Keywords truth  limit  convergence  realism  pragmatism  deflationism  correspondence theory of truth  coherence theory of truth  C.S. Peirce
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DOI 10.1111/phc3.12114
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.Richard Rorty - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.Richard Rorty - 1989 - The Personalist Forum 5 (2):149-152.

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Citations of this work BETA

Lucid Education: Resisting Resistance to Inquiry.Gilbert Burgh & Simone Thornton - 2016 - Oxford Review of Education 42 (2):165–177.
Prospects for Peircean Truth.Andrew Howat - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):365-387.

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