Making it explicit and clear: From "strong" to "hyper-" inferentialism in Brandom and Peirce

Metaphilosophy 39 (1):105–123 (2008)
This article explores how Robert Brandom's original "inferentialist" philosophical framework should be positioned with respect to the classical pragmatist tradition. It is argued that Charles Peirce's original attack on the use of "intuition" in nineteenth-century philosophy of mind is in fact a form of inferentialism, and thus an antecedent relatively unexplored by Brandom in his otherwise comprehensive and illuminating "tales of the mighty dead." However, whereas Brandom stops short at a merely "strong" inferentialism, which admits some non-inferential mental content , Peirce embraces a total, that is, "hyper-," inferentialism. Some consequences of this difference are explored, and Peirce's more thoroughgoing position is defended
Keywords Peirce  Brandom  inferentialism  intuition
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00527.x
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Andrew Howat (2014). Prospects for Peircean Truth. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):365-387.

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