Philosophia 28 (1-4):297-318 (2001)

Cathy Legg
Deakin University
Peirce wrote that Hume’s argument against miracles (which is generally liked by twentieth century philosophers for its antireligious conclusion) "completely misunderstood the true nature of" ’abduction’. This paper argues that if Hume’s argumentative strategy were seriously used in all situations (not just those in which we seek to "banish superstition"), it would deliver a choking epistemological conservatism. It suggests that some morals for contemporary naturalistic philosophy may be drawn from Peirce’s argument against Hume.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Philosophy of Language   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Science
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Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.1007/BF02379782
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References found in this work BETA

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - Oxford University Press.
Bayes or Bust?John Earman - 1992 - Bradford.

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Hume and Peirce on the Ultimate Stability of Belief.Ryan Pollock & David W. Agler - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):245-269.

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