David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 55 (2):191-207 (1983)
A central issue in epistemology concerns the connection between truth and justification. The burden of our paper is to explain this connection. Reliabilism, defended by Goldman, assumes that the connection is one of reliability. We argue that this assumption is too strong. We argue that foundational theories, such as those articulated by Pollock and Chisholm fail to elucidate the connection. We consider the potentiality of coherence theories to explain the truth connection by means of higher level convictions about probabilities, which we call doxastic ascent, and defend such a theory. Our defense appeals to the work of Reid and contemporary cognitive psychology in order to account for the psychological reality of higher level evaluations
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Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer Lackey (2007). Norms of Assertion. Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Joshua Alexander & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2007). Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):56–80.
Jonathan M. Weinberg (2007). How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):318–343.
Duncan Pritchard (2010). Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis. Synthese 175 (1):133 - 151.
Peter J. Graham (2012). Epistemic Entitlement. Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
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