Synthese 74 (3):329 - 347 (1988)

Keith Lehrer
University of Arizona
Internalism and externalism are both false. What is needed to convert true belief into knowledge is the appropriate blend of subjective and objective factors to yield the appropriate sort of connection between mind and the world. The sort of knowledge explicated is calledmetaknowledge and is knowledge that involves the evaluation of incoming information in terms of a background system. It is proposed that knowledge is equivalent to undefeated justification which is justification on the basis of every system that eliminates or corrects any error in what a person accepts. The system of such system is called the ultrasystem of the person. This account appeals both to internal factors and external factors and involves appeal to both normative requirements and empirical constraints. Justification is defined in terms of a comparative notion of rationality adapted from Chisholm.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00869634
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief.T. Paxson & K. Lehrer - 1969 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

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Coherencia y justificación.Valeriano Iranzo - 1998 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 20 (1):91.
Counterexamples and Prophylactics.Terry L. Price - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 74 (3):273 - 282.

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