Grazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1):121-126 (1975)

Authors
Keith Lehrer
University of Arizona
Abstract
Memory sometimes yields knowledge and sometimes does not. It is, however, natural to suppose that i f a man remembers that p, then he knows that p and formerly knew that p. Remembering something is plausibly construed as a f o rm of knowing something which one has not forgotten and which one knew previously. We argue, to the contrary, that this thesis is false. We present four counterexamples to the thesis that support a different analysis of remembering. We propose that a person remembers that p (at t) if and only if the thought or conviction that p comes from memory (at t) when, in fact, it is true that p
Keywords Epistemology  Knowing  Memory  Remembering
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ISBN(s) 0165-9227
DOI 10.5840/gps197518
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Remembering Without Knowing.Sven Bernecker - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):137 – 156.
Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Theories of Remembering.Steven James - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:109-127.
On Memory Knowledge.Shin Sakuragi - 2010 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 43 (1):61-77.

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