Ultimate Preference and Explanation

Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (4):600-615 (2020)
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Abstract

The articles by Corlett, McKenna and Waller in the present issue call for some further enlightenment on Lehrer’s defense of classical compatibilism. Ultimate explanation in terms of a power preference, which is the primary explanation for choice, is now the central feature of his defense. This includes the premise that scientific determinism may fail to explain our choices. Sylvain Bromberger showed that nomological deduction is not sufficient for explanation. A power preference, which is by definition a preference over alternatives, is the primary explanation when the power preference explains the choice without the need to appeal to anything else, including even anything that explains it. The author notes that explanation is not generally transitive. The power preference must stand alone as an ultimate explanation independent of other explanations. It is thus the ultimate preference over alternatives of choice.

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Keith Lehrer
University of Arizona

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