God − Moore = Ramsey (A Reply to Chalmers and Hájek)

Topoi 30 (1):47-51 (2011)
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Abstract

Famously, Frank P. Ramsey suggested a test for the acceptability of conditionals. Recently, David Chalmers and Alan Hájek (2007) have criticized a qualitative variant of the Ramsey test for indicative conditionals. In this paper we argue for the following three claims: (i) Chalmers and Hájek are right that the variant of the Ramsey test that they attack is not the correct way of spelling out an acceptability test for indicative conditionals. But there is a suppositional variant of the Ramsey test which is still stated in purely qualitative terms, which avoids the problems, and which looks correct. (ii) While the variant of the Ramsey test that Chalmers and Hájek criticize is not correct, it is still a good approximation of a correct formulation of the Ramsey test which may be usefully employed in various contexts. (iii) The variant of the Ramsey test that Chalmers and Hájek suggest as a substitute for the deficient version of the Ramsey test is itself subject to worries similar to those raised by Chalmers and Hájek, if it is given a non-suppositional interpretation

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Hannes Leitgeb
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

References found in this work

The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Edited by R. B. Braithwaite.
General Propositions and Causality.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1929 - In The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner. pp. 237-255.
Ramsey + Moore = God.David J. Chalmers & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):170-172.
The foundations of causal decision theory. [REVIEW]Mirek Janusz - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):296-300.

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