How to link assertion and knowledge without going contextualist: A reply to DeRose's "assertion, knowledge, and context"

Philosophical Studies 134 (2):111 - 129 (2007)
Keith DeRose has recently argued that the contextual variability of appropriate assertion, together with the knowledge account of assertion, yields a direct argument that 'knows' is semantically context-sensitive. The argument fails because of an equivocation on the notion of warranted assertability. Once the equivocation is removed, it can be seen that the invariantist can retain the knowledge account of assertion and explain the contextual variability of appropriate assertion by appealing to Williamson's suggestion that practical and conversational considerations can influence the extent to which adherence to the constitutive norm of assertion matters.
Keywords assertion  contextualism  DeRose  epistemology  Williamsonm
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9081-4
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References found in this work BETA
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Keith DeRose - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):346–350.
An Invalid Argument for Contextualism.Thomas A. Blackson - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):344–345.

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Citations of this work BETA
Contextualism and Intellectualism.Matthew McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):383-405.
Is 'Know' an Indexical?Kazuyoshi Kamiyama - 2009 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 42 (2):75-87.

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