I argue for a new interpretation of Locke’s account of akrasia. On this interpretation, akrasia occurs on Locke’s account because certain cognitive biases endemic to the human mind dispose us to privilege present over future happiness. As a result, we end up irrationally pursuing present pleasure and the removal of present pain even as we simultaneously judge that doing so runs contrary to our own greater good. In this sense, I argue that Locke seeks to diagnose akrasia by identifying its underlying psychological causes.
Keywords Locke  akrasia  weakness of will  judgment  desire
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DOI 10.32881/jomp.105
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References found in this work BETA

Locke's Metaphysics.Matthew Stuart - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Consciousness in Locke.Shelley Weinberg - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
Does Locke Have an Akrasia Problem?Leonardo Moauro & Samuel C. Rickless - 2019 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 1 (1):9.
Leibniz on Locke on Weakness of Will.Ezio Vailati - 1990 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (2):213-228.

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Locke on the Motivation to Suspend Desire.Matthew A. Leisinger - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):48-61.

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