In Ken Gemes & Simon May (eds.), Philosophical Topics. Oxford University Press. pp. 119-137 (2005)

Authors
Brian Leiter
University of Chicago
Abstract
The essay offers a philosophical reconstruction of Nietzsche's theory of the will, focusing on (1) Nietzsche's account of the phenomenology of "willing " an action, the experience we have which leads us (causally) to conceive of ourselves as exercising our will; (2) Nietzsche's arguments that the experiences picked out by the phenomenology are not causally connected to the resulting action (at least not in a way sufficient to underwrite ascriptions of moral responsibility); and (3) Nietzsche's account of the actual causal genesis of action. Particular attention is given to passages from Daybreak, Beyond Good and Evil and Twilight of the Idols and a revised version of my earlier account of Nietzsche's epiphenomenalism is defended. Finally, recent work in empirical psychology (Libet, Wegner) is shown to support Nietzsche's skepticism that our "feeling " of will is a reliable guide to the causation of action
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DOI 10.5840/philtopics200533219
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Nietzsche and Kant on the Will: Two Models of Reflective Agency.Paul Katsafanas - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):185-216.
Against Nietzsche’s '''Theory''' of the Drives.Tom Stern - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):121--140.

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