Reasonableness, Intellectual Modesty, and Reciprocity in Political Justification
Ethics 122 (4):721-747 (2012)
Abstract
Political liberals ask citizens not to appeal to certain considerations, including religious and philosophical convictions, in political deliberation. We argue that political liberals must include a demanding requirement of intellectual modesty in their ideal of citizenship in order to motivate this deliberative restraint. The requirement calls on each citizen to believe that the best reasoners disagree about the considerations that she is barred from appealing to. Along the way, we clarify how requirements of intellectual modesty relate to moral reasons for deliberative restraint. And we argue against attempts to weaken our requirement of intellectual modesty by emphasizing those moral reasons.Author Profiles
DOI
10.1086/666499
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Citations of this work
Political Liberalism and Respect.Han van Wietmarschen - 2021 - Journal of Political Philosophy 29 (3):353-374.
Political Liberalism and Political Community.R. J. Leland & Han van Wietmarschen - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (2):142-167.
In Defence of Intelligible Reasons in Public Justification.Kevin Vallier - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):596-616.
Are Public Reason Liberalism’s Epistemological Commitments Indefensible?Collis Tahzib - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.