Defining disease beyond conceptual analysis: an analysis of conceptual analysis in philosophy of medicine

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (4):309-325 (2013)

Maël Lemoine
Université de Poitiers
Conceptual analysis of health and disease is portrayed as consisting in the confrontation of a set of criteria—a “definition”—with a set of cases, called instances of either “health” or “ disease.” Apart from logical counter-arguments, there is no other way to refute an opponent’s definition than by providing counter-cases. As resorting to intensional stipulation is not forbidden, several contenders can therefore be deemed to have succeeded. This implies that conceptual analysis alone is not likely to decide between naturalism and normativism. An alternative to this approach would be to examine whether the concept of disease can be naturalized
Keywords Disease  Definition  Conceptual analysis  Naturalism  Normativism  Naturalization
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DOI 10.1007/s11017-013-9261-5
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References found in this work BETA

Health as a Theoretical Concept.Christopher Boorse - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
Disease.Rachel Cooper - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 33 (2):263-282.

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Citations of this work BETA

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