Philosophiques 47 (1):139 (2020)

Authors
Marie-Pier Lemay
University of Guelph
Abstract
ABSTRACT. — This article examines the concept of adaptive preference as it has appeared in feminist political philosophy since the 2000’s. This concept refers to preferences shaped in compliance with an oppressive environment and that jeopardizes one’s well-being. In the first part, the two most influential conceptions of adaptive preference will be discussed : the ones provided by the philosophers Martha Nussbaum and Serene Khader. Afterwards, I will assess these conceptions in the light of recent work by feminist anthropologists Saba Mahmood and Lila Abu-Lughod, in which they revaluate the political project of feminist philosophy underlying adaptive preferences. RÉSUMÉ. — Cet article porte sur le concept de préférence adaptative tel qu’il est apparu en philosophie féministe politique et anglophone depuis les années 2000. Ce concept désigne les préférences formées conformément à un milieu oppressif et qui vont à l’encontre du bien-être. Dans un premier temps, il sera question des deux théorisations les plus influentes à l’heure actuelle: celles développées par les philosophes Martha Nussbaum et Serene Khader. Ensuite, j’évaluerai ces positions à l’aune des récents travaux des anthropologues fémi- nistes Saba Mahmood et Lila Abu-Lughod, dans lesquels elles remettent en question le projet politique de la philosophie féministe sous-jacent aux préfé- rences adaptatives.
Keywords Development Ethics  Feminist Philosophy  Adaptive preferences
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DOI 10.7202/1070254ar
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References found in this work BETA

Republicanism.Philip Pettit - 2000 - Mind 109 (435):640-644.
Adaptive Preference.H. E. Baber - 2007 - Social Theory and Practice 33 (1):105-126.

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