Goldman on knowledge as true belief

Erkenntnis 62 (2):145-155 (2005)
Alvin Goldman contends that, in addition to the familiar sense or use of the term “knowledge” according to which knowledge is at least true justified belief, there is a weaker yet strict sense or use of the term “knowledge” according to which knowledge amounts to nothing more than information-possession or mere true belief. In this paper, I argue that Goldman has failed to show that there is such a weaker sense, and that, even if he had shown this, he has not shown that this putative weaker sense is a strict one by his own criterion for strictness.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-004-1213-z
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Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Deeply Contingent a Priori Knowledge.John Hawthorne - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):247-269.
Why Knowledge is Merely True Belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):167-180.
Knowledge is Merely True Belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1991 - American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (2):157-165.
Is Mere True Belief Knowledge?Le Morvan Pierre - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (2):151-168.

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