David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):515-532 (2007)
This article provides a brief explanation of Robert Kane’s indeterministic, event-causal libertarian theory of freedom and responsibility. It is noted that a number of authors have criticized libertarian theories,such as Kane’s, by presenting the problem of luck. After noting how Kane has tried to answer this problem in his recent writings, the author goes on to explain Ishtiyaque Haji’s recent version of the luckargument. The author considers three possible Kanian replies to Haji’s luck argument and argues that the third reply can adequately answer the luck objection. It is also noted that the third reply requires making some significant alterations to Kane’s theory that would also help him resolve certain problems with his views about responsibility for character
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy General Interest|
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