Knowledge, Ignorance and True Belief

Theoria 77 (1):32-41 (2011)
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Abstract

Suppose that knowledge and ignorance are complements in the sense of being mutually exclusive: for person S and fact p, either S knows that p or is ignorant that p. Understood in this way, ignorance amounts to a lack or absence of knowledge: S is ignorant that p if and only if it is not the case that S knows that p. Let us call the thesis that knowledge and ignorance are opposites the “Complement Thesis”. In this article, I discuss its deployment in an ingenious new argument advanced by Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson (2009) which, if sound, establishes that there is a kind of knowledge that amounts to nothing more than true belief. I rebut their argument and in doing so delineate some important epistemological lessons brought to light by the contrast between ignorance and knowledge

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Citations of this work

Ignorance and inquiry.Duncan Pritchard - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):111-124.
Intellectual virtue and its role in epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-20.
A Logic for Disjunctive Ignorance.Jie Fan - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (6):1293-1312.

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References found in this work

Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Pathways to knowledge: private and public.Alvin I. Goldman - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-41.
Why knowledge is merely true belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):167-180.

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