Knowledge, Ignorance and True Belief

Theoria 77 (1):32-41 (2011)
Abstract
Suppose that knowledge and ignorance are complements in the sense of being mutually exclusive: for person S and fact p, either S knows that p or is ignorant that p. Understood in this way, ignorance amounts to a lack or absence of knowledge: S is ignorant that p if and only if it is not the case that S knows that p. Let us call the thesis that knowledge and ignorance are opposites the “Complement Thesis”. In this article, I discuss its deployment in an ingenious new argument advanced by Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson (2009) which, if sound, establishes that there is a kind of knowledge that amounts to nothing more than true belief. I rebut their argument and in doing so delineate some important epistemological lessons brought to light by the contrast between ignorance and knowledge
Keywords ignorance  Olsson  knowledge  Goldman  true belief
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01083.x
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. H. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19--41.
Deeply Contingent a Priori Knowledge.John Hawthorne - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):247-269.

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