Stéphane Lemaire
University of Rennes 1
Nous jugeons les réponses émotionnelles comme plus ou moins raisonnables étant donné leur objet et le contexte. Je soutiens que la légitimité de ces jugements repose sur le caractère raisonnable des désirs ou des dispositions émotionnelles qui expliquent ces réponses émotionnelles. Il est déraisonnable d’être triste de ne pas satisfaire un désir déraisonnable. Mais comment un désir peut-il être déraisonnable ? Je rejette l’idée selon laquelle les désirs seraient raisonnables parce que cohérents. Je suggère que nos désirs et nos dispositions émotionnelles sont raisonnables à deux conditions : premièrement, qu’ils contribuent à une vie subjectivement heureuse ; deuxièmement, qu’ils soient moralement justifiés.
Keywords emotion  rationality  practical rationality  fittingness  coherence
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DOI 10.3917/rphi.162.0215
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