Sensory experience and intentionalism

Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702 (2008)
Abstract
Increasingly prominent in the recent literature on the philosophy of perception, Intentionalism holds that sensory experience is inherently intentional, where to be intentional is to be about, or directed on, something. This article explores Intentionalism's prospects as a viable ontological and epistemological alternative to the traditional trinity of theories of sensory experience: the Sense-Datum Theory, the Adverbial Theory, and the Theory of Appearing.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00148.x
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References found in this work BETA
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
An Adverbialist–Objectualist Account of Pain.Greg Janzen - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):859-876.

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