Sosa on epistemic circularity and reflective knowledge

Metaphilosophy 40 (2):187-194 (2009)

Authors
Noah Lemos
College of William and Mary
Abstract
Abstract: Ernest Sosa has done important work on epistemic circularity, epistemic virtue, and reflective knowledge. He holds that epistemic circularity need not be vicious and need not prevent us from knowing that our ways of forming beliefs are reliable. In this article, I briefly explore Sosa's defense of this view and raise some questions about what is required for reflective knowledge.
Keywords Sosa  epistemic virtue  epistemic circularity  reflective knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01578.x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge in Perspective.Ernest Sosa - 1991 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.
Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602.
Metaepistemology and Skepticism.Richard Fumerton - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):782-787.

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