Searle offers an account of seeing as a conscious state not constituted by the object(s) seen. I focus in this article on his biological case for this thesis, and argue that the biological considerations he adduces neither establish his own position nor defeat a rival object-inclusive view. I show (among other things) that taking seeing to be a biological state is compatible with its being (partially) constituted by the object(s) seen.
Keywords Seeing  Perception  Biology  Biologism  Mental States  Consciousness
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsc.2018.10.004
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