Philosophia 41 (1):239-256 (2013)

Rik Peels has forcefully argued that, contrary to what is widely held, ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he has argued against the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and argued for what he calls “the New View” according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. In this paper, I defend the Standard View against Peels’s latest case for the New View
Keywords Ignorance  Belief  Knowledge  Propositions  Facts  Truth  Falsehood
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-013-9417-6
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References found in this work BETA

What is Ignorance?Rik Peels - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):57-67.
On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels.Pierre LeMorvan - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):335-344.

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Citations of this work BETA

When Ignorance Excuses.Pierre Le Morvan - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):22-31.
Ignorant Cognition: A Response to Copeland, Ervas, and Osta-Vélez. [REVIEW]Selene Arfini - 2021 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 40 (2):237-241.
Epistemic Justification and the Ignorance Excuse.Nathan Biebel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3005-3028.

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