Disciplined syntacticism and moral expressivism

Abstract
Moral Expressivists typically concede that, in some minimal sense, moral sentences are truth-apt but claim that in some more robust sense they are not. The Immodest Disciplined Syntacticist, a species of minimalist about truth, raises a doubt as to whether this contrast can be made out. I here address this challenge by motivating and describing a distinction between reducibly and irreducibly truth-apt sentences. In the light of this distinction the Disciplined Syntacticist must either adopt a more modest version of his theory, friendlier to Expressivism, or substantially modify it, abandoning one of its central conditions on truth-aptness. One natural and promising such modification, the Pure Discipline View, is described and its implications for an understanding of Expressivism briefly discussed
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00242.x
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Citations of this work BETA
Logic and Semantics for Imperatives.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):617-664.
Moral Realism, Face-Values and Presumptions.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):158-179.
The Moral Belief Problem.Neil Sinclair - 2006 - Ratio 19 (2):249–260.
Recent Work in Expressivism.Neil Sinclair - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):136-147.

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