Argumentos de Razón Técnica 1 (22):120-137 (2019)

Malena León
National University of Córdoba (PhD)
La actitud del diseño es una estrategia interpretativa propuesta por Dennett, que consiste en tratar al sistema, cuyo “comportamiento” se quiere predecir, bajo el supuesto de que sus partes cumplen funciones que obedecen a un diseño satisfactorio. Sin embargo, estudios recientes sobre atribución funcional en artefactos técnicos consideran que la actitud del diseño supone una estrategia inadecuada para entender qué hace un artefacto técnico. En particular, dos críticas han ganado visibilidad. Por una parte, Vermaas et al. (2013) señalan una inconsistencia en la propuesta dennettiana de la actitud del diseño: las intenciones del diseñador a veces desempeñan un papel en la interpretación de los artefactos y a veces no lo hacen, sin tener finalmente una intuición clara sobre su rol. Por otra parte, Vaesen y Van Amerongen (2008) sostienen que la actitud del diseño admite dos interpretaciones, una descriptiva y una normativa, y que ambas son implausibles. No obstante, en este trabajo argumentamos que estas críticas son rebatibles y que el problema reside en que ambas acusaciones, i.e. inconsistencia e implausibilidad, suponen una interpretación incorrecta de la posición de Dennett. The design attitude is an interpretive strategy proposed by Dennett, which consists of treating the system, whose “behavior” is to be predicted, under the assumption that its parts fulfill functions that accomplish a satisfactory design. Recent studies on technical artifacts' functional attribution claim that the design attitude is an inadequate strategy to elicit what a technical artifact does. In particular, two criticisms have gained visibility. On the one hand, Vermas et al (2013) remark an inconsistency in Dennett’s design stance. The very designer's intentions sometimes play a role in the interpretation of artifacts and sometimes they don´t, without finally having a clear intuition about their role. On the other hand, Vaesen and Van Amerongen (2008) argue that the design stance admits two interpretations, a descriptive and a normative one and that both are implausible. However, we argue that these criticisms miss the point given that both accusations, i.e. of inconsistency and of implausibility, result from a wrong interpretation of Dennett's position.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Realism and Human Kinds.Amie L. Thomasson - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):580–609.
The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artifacts.Daniel C. Dennett - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:177-194.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Category Cognition and Dennett’s Design Stance.Hector MacIntyre - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):483-495.
A Kantian Stance on the Intentional Stance.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):29-52.
Reading Mother Nature's Mind.Ruth G. Millikan - 2000 - In Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.
Dennett on Free Will.Craig Ross - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (2):137-149.
Dennett y el realismo fisicista.Edgar Maraguat - 2010 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía:303-310.
The Rationality Assumption.Richard Dub - 2015 - In Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.), Content and Consciousness Revisited. With Replies by Daniel Dennett. Springer. pp. 93-110.


Added to PP index

Total views
23 ( #472,377 of 2,448,102 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #30,650 of 2,448,102 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes