Synthese 196 (11):4775-4805 (2019)

Benjamin Lennertz
Colgate University
What we can call asymmetric disagreement occurs when one agent is in disagreement with another, but not vice-versa. In this paper, I give an example of and develop a framework for understanding this phenomenon. One pivotal feature of my example is that one of the agents in the scenario has a belief about what might be the case—a might-belief. I show that a traditional account of might-beliefs and disagreement cannot explain the initially surprising phenomenon of asymmetric disagreement. In order to provide an explanation, I develop a dynamic account of might-beliefs and a corresponding account of disagreement. I close by exploring a choice point for our account—showing that the simple dynamic account has some controversial (though, perhaps, true) consequences. I explore how revisionary notions of validity, inconsistency, and disagreement can allow us to avoid these consequences if we wish.
Keywords Disagreement  Epistemic Modals  Dynamic Semantics  Consistency  Validity  Belief
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1688-9
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,229
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.

View all 45 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Probabilistic Antecedents and Conditional Attitudes.Benjamin Lennertz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):62-79.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

First-Order Theistic Religion: Intentional Power Beyond Belief.Paul K. Moser - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (3):31-48.
Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a.
Possible Disagreements and Defeat.Brandon Carey - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):371-381.
The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.
The Problem of Deep Disagreement.Klemens Kappel - 2012 - Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):7-25.
Webs Of Faith As A Source Of Reasonable Disagreement.Gregory Brazeal - 2011 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 23 (4):421-448.
Armchair Disagreement.Marc Andree Weber - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (4):527-549.
Epistemic Modals and Credal Disagreement.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):987-1011.
The Moral Evil Demons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press.
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. [REVIEW]Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):866-868.


Added to PP index

Total views
47 ( #229,439 of 2,455,487 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #98,327 of 2,455,487 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes