Authors
Benjamin Lennertz
Colgate University
Abstract
This paper makes explicit the way in which many theorists of the epistemology of uncertainty, or formal epistemologists, are committed to a version of noncognitivism—one about thoughts that something is likely. It does so by drawing an analogy with metaethical noncognitivism. I explore the degree to which the motivations for both views are similar and how both views have to grapple with the Frege‐Geach Problem about complex thoughts. The major upshot of recognizing this noncognitivism is that it presents challenges and opportunities not only in the philosophy of mind and language but also in epistemology itself. I present some examples where attention to the implicit noncognitivism in formal epistemology has affected or should affect epistemological theory. And I suggest that it is likely that further examples of this sort will arise.
Keywords Noncognitivism  Formal Epistemology  The Frege-Geach Problem  Credences
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12639
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,219
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
Assertion.P. T. Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.

View all 47 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.
Probabilistic Antecedents and Conditional Attitudes.Benjamin Lennertz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):62-79.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Ascriptivism.P. T. Geach - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.
Assertion.P. T. Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
Normative Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists.Andrew Sepielli - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.
The Frege-Geach Problem.Jack Woods - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 226-242.
Meaning and Speech Acts.John R. Searle - 1962 - Philosophical Review 71 (4):423-432.
Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem.Nicholas Unwin - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):337-352.
The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.
Are Expressivists Guilty of Wishful Thinking?Robert Mabrito - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1069-1081.
The Frege–Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism.Matti Eklund - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):705-712.
What is the Frege-Geach Problem?Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):703-720.
Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference.Mark Bryant Budolfson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-09-16

Total views
64 ( #166,603 of 2,448,396 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #64,735 of 2,448,396 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes