Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):265-274 (2003)
It has recently been argued by Cian Dorr that if noncognitivism is true, inferences to factual conclusions from premises at least one of which is moral must be condemned as irrational. For, given a noncognitivist understanding of what it is to accept such premises, such reasoning would be wishful thinking: irrationally revising our views about the world to make them cohere with our desires and feelings. This he takes to be a reductio of noncognitivism. I argue that no compelling case to this effect has been made out. I show how, in many cases, non-cognitivists can make excellent sense of the rational legitimacy of such arguments. In cases where they plausibly cannot do so, moreover, this legitimacy is highly doubtful for independently plausible reasons and should be doubted even by cognitivists.
|Keywords||Cian Dorr irrationality metaethics noncognitivism normative logic wishful thinking|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference.Mark Bryant Budolfson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.
A Primitive Solution to the Negation Problem.Derek Shiller - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):725-740.
Are Expressivists Guilty of Wishful Thinking?Robert Mabrito - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1069-1081.
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