Reduction, Explanation, and Realism

& (eds.)
New York: Oxford University Press (1992)
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Abstract

Reduction has long been a favourite method of analysis in all areas of philosophy, but in recent years there has been a reaction against it. The contributors to this volume examine the motivations for such anti-reductionist views and assess their coherence and success in a number of fields.

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B835.5.R43 1992

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9780198242734   0198242735

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Chapters

Elimination versus nonreductive physicalism.Brian Loar
Irreducibility and teleology.David Papineau
Physics, biology, and common-sense psychology.Jennifer Hornsby
Supervenience, composition, and physicalism.David Charles
The autonomy of colour.Justin Broackes
The autonomy of colour.Justin Broackes
Weak externalism and psychological reduction.Cynthia Macdonald
Modest reductions and the unity of science.  (pages 19--43)Peter Smith
Structural explanation in social theory.  (pages 97--131)Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit
The limitations of pluralism.  (pages 179--224)Adrian Cussins
The autonomy of colour.  (pages 191-225)Justin Broackes
Reduction, Causality and Normativity.  (pages 225--38)Kathleen Lennon
Valuing: Desiring or Believing?  (pages 323--60)Michael Smith

Similar books and articles

David Charles and Kathleen Lennon, eds., Reduction, Explanation, and Realism Reviewed by.Wayne I. Henry - 1994 - Philosophy in Review 14 (2):79-82.
Structural explanation in social theory.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1992 - In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 97--131.
Reduction, Causality and Normativity.Kathleen Lennon - 1992 - In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 225--38.
Weak externalism and psychological reduction.Cynthia Macdonald - 1992 - In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Irreducibility and teleology.David Papineau - 1992 - In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. New York: Oxford University Press.
The limitations of pluralism.Adrian Cussins - 1992 - In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 179--224.
Supervenience, composition, and physicalism.David Charles - 1992 - In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Valuing: Desiring or Believing?Michael Smith - 1992 - In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 323--60.
Modest reductions and the unity of science.Peter Smith - 1992 - In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 19--43.

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Citations of this work

Practical unreason.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1993 - Mind 102 (405):53-79.
Moral explanation and the special sciences.Brad Majors - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (2):121 - 152.
Emergence and Downward Causation.Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald - 2010 - In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in mind. New York: Oxford University Press.

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