Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy
Philosophical Studies 177 (3):573-596 (2020)
Abstract
This paper is about epistemic dilemmas, i.e., cases in which one is doomed to have a doxastic attitude that is rationally impermissible no matter what. My aim is to develop and defend a position according to which there can be genuine rational indeterminacy; that is, it can be indeterminate which principles of rationality one should satisfy and thus indeterminate which doxastic attitudes one is permitted or required to have. I am going to argue that this view can resolve epistemic dilemmas in a systematic way while also enjoying some important advantages over its rivals.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Embracing Epistemic Dilemmas.David Christensen - 2021 - In Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles.
Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic.Aleks Knoks - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:141--74.
Normative Indeterminacy in the Epistemic Domain.Nicholas Leonard & Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup.
Rationality for the Self-Aware (Ernest Sosa Lecture).David Christensen - 2021 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 95:215-236.
References found in this work
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.