Philosophical Studies 177 (3):573-596 (2020)

Authors
Nick Leonard
Northwestern University
Abstract
This paper is about epistemic dilemmas, i.e., cases in which one is doomed to have a doxastic attitude that is rationally impermissible no matter what. My aim is to develop and defend a position according to which there can be genuine rational indeterminacy; that is, it can be indeterminate which principles of rationality one should satisfy and thus indeterminate which doxastic attitudes one is permitted or required to have. I am going to argue that this view can resolve epistemic dilemmas in a systematic way while also enjoying some important advantages over its rivals.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1195-3
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References found in this work BETA

Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Possibility of Altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford Clarendon Press.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.

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Citations of this work BETA

Misleading Higher-Order Evidence, Conflicting Ideals, and Defeasible Logic.Aleks Knoks - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
Normative Indeterminacy in the Epistemic Domain.Nicholas Leonard & Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup.

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