Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy

Philosophical Studies 177 (3):573-596 (2020)
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Abstract

This paper is about epistemic dilemmas, i.e., cases in which one is doomed to have a doxastic attitude that is rationally impermissible no matter what. My aim is to develop and defend a position according to which there can be genuine rational indeterminacy; that is, it can be indeterminate which principles of rationality one should satisfy and thus indeterminate which doxastic attitudes one is permitted or required to have. I am going to argue that this view can resolve epistemic dilemmas in a systematic way while also enjoying some important advantages over its rivals.

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Nicholas Leonard
University of San Francisco

References found in this work

Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.

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