In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 67-85 (2018)

Authors
Paolo Leonardi
University of Bologna
Abstract
Frege’s claim that sentences are names of truth-values, I argue, was drawn to fit the formal project, but it respects our pre-theoretical intuitions and does not undermine the sentence’s central semantic role. I do a minimal work both on the expression and on its referent, connecting the sentence and the definite description, suggesting an intuitive referent for a true sentence, suggesting a motive for Frege’s choice of the truth-values as referents, and finally suggesting an understanding of the False as a referent.
Keywords Sentence  Name  Truth-value  Frege
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DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-95777-7_4
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