Neal Tognazzini
Western Washington University
Felipe Leon
El Camino College
In this paper we argue that defenders of Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities do not need to construct a metaphysically possible scenario in which an agent is morally responsible despite lacking the ability to do otherwise. Rather, there is a weaker (but equally legitimate) sense in which Frankfurt-style counterexamples can succeed. All that's needed is the claim that the ability to do otherwise is no part of what grounds moral responsibility, when the agent is indeed morally responsible.
Keywords Frankfurt cases  alternative possibilities  grounding  Moral Responsibility  Free Will
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00340.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Theory of the Normative Force of Pleas.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):479-502.
How Valuable Could a Material Object Be?Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):332-343.
Grounding the Luck Objection.Neal A. Tognazzini - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):127-138.

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