How to make the generality problem work for you

Acta Analytica 24 (4):275-286 (2009)
Abstract
Reliabilist theories of knowledge face the “generality problem”; any token of a belief-forming processes instantiates types of different levels of generality, which can vary in reliability. I argue that we exploit this situation in epistemic evaluation; we appraise beliefs in different ways by adverting to reliability at different levels of generality. We can detect at least two distinct uses of reliability, which underlie different sorts of appraisals of beliefs and believers.
Keywords Generality problem  Reliabilism  Epistemic justification  Knowledge  Virtue epistemology  Epistemic responsibility
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-009-0060-6
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge in Perspective.Ernest Sosa - 1991 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge.John Greco - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):57–69.
The Generality Problem for Reliabilism.E. Conee & R. Feldman - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (1):1-29.

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