Acta Analytica 24 (4):275-286 (2009)
Reliabilist theories of knowledge face the “generality problem”; any token of a belief-forming processes instantiates types of different levels of generality, which can vary in reliability. I argue that we exploit this situation in epistemic evaluation; we appraise beliefs in different ways by adverting to reliability at different levels of generality. We can detect at least two distinct uses of reliability, which underlie different sorts of appraisals of beliefs and believers.
|Keywords||Generality problem Reliabilism Epistemic justification Knowledge Virtue epistemology Epistemic responsibility|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation.William Alston - 2005 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge.John Greco - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):57–69.
The Generality Problem for Reliabilism.E. Conee & R. Feldman - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (1):1-29.
Citations of this work BETA
Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad.Guy Axtell - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1):73-94.
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