Scoring Rules, Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity

Theory and Decision 49 (2):175-196 (2000)
In a three-candidate election, a scoring rule s (s in [0,1]) assigns 1, s, and 0 points (respectively) to each first, second and third place in the individual preference rankings. The Condorcet efficiency of a scoring rule is defined as the conditional probability that this rule selects the winner in accordance with Condorcet criteria (three Condorcet criteria are considered in the paper). We are interested in the following question: What rule s has the greatest Condorcet efficiency? After recalling the known answer to this question, we investigate the impact of social homogeneity on the optimal value of ?. One of the most salient results we obtain is that the optimality of the Borda rule (s=1/2) holds only if the voters act in an independent way.
Keywords Voting rules  Borda rule  Plurality rule  Condorcet criteria  Social homogeneity
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DOI 10.1023/A:1005257316414
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